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he military intervention against Daesh began in September 2014, when a coalition led 
by the United States was formed in the margins of the NATO Summit in Wales, to 
conduct air strikes against the Daesh sites in Syria and Iraq. The death of 130 people as 
a result of the November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris has dramatically changed the course of 
this military campaign, prompting the European Union to activate the mutual assistance 
clause contained in Art. 42.7 of the EU Treaty. Does this initiative mean that .war being 
Europeanised, or are selected European states joining a French-led coalition of the willing?  
Thus far, the latter appears to be the correct answer. Nevertheless, it can’t be denied that recent 
events in Paris have compelled the EU to adopt a united response in defence of its values of 
democracy, peace and freedom. Europe seems to have re-discovered a practical notion of 
solidarity as the keeper of a safe and secure continent.  
In practical terms, the rationale behind the activation of the clause, approved by EU Defence 
Ministers meeting on November 17th, is twofold. First, to substantiate previous rhetorical calls 
for the EU to stand united against common security threats. Second, to provide a more flexible 
framework to coordinate responses collectively as well as bilaterally, overcoming the 
unanimity required for operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
and outside of NATO.  
With the activation of the assistance clause, EU member states are now entering the 
unchartered territory of large-scale conflict taking place outside as well as within their borders. 
The implications could be deeper than the clause itself, and might entail a redefinition of the 
global role of the Union, as well as a commitment by member states to maintain unity over 
time.  
What is the mutual assistance clause? 
Art. 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates: 
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States. 
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By invoking this article, the French government made a deliberate choice not to appeal to 
either of the other two other collective security agreements in place: the EU Solidarity Clause 
(Art. 222 TEU) and NATO’s Article 5.1 
France’s choice: A political act 
Why did President François Hollande invoke the EU mutual assistance clause, as opposed to 
the other possible options? The first and perhaps most important reason is political. Art. 42.7 
allowed France to send a strong political signal that Europe stands united against a common 
threat to its territory and society, especially as it implies a common European response in 
internal and border security – domains in which NATO could not take action. It defined the 
aggression as a matter of European security, leaving aside (possibly momentarily) the 
transatlantic link, especially considering that the debate in Washington could have been easily 
distorted by the presidential campaign.  
The second reason is procedural. In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, the other options would 
have required more time, slowing down the decision-making and allowing potential divisions 
to arise between partners. The Solidarity Clause would have activated a wider array of EU 
instruments, but these require complex inter-institutional cooperation and a longer time frame 
for their execution. The procedures for the activation of NATO’s Article 5 are relatively quick, 
but would require an explicit involvement of the United States, potentially triggering a 
protracted domestic debate on scaling up military engagement in the region, moving from a 
strategy focused on special operations raids and building capacity of local forces to a large-
scale intervention on the ground. NATO’s involvement would have been problematic also 
considering Russia’s support to the Assad regime and potential opposition to the presence of 
the Atlantic alliance in Syria. Conversely, Art. 42.7 provides France with the flexibility to 
conduct bilateral consultations with EU member states on the types of aid and assistance 
required, bypassing Brussels’ bureaucratic machinery and avoiding complex negotiations 
with external partners. As stated by HR/VP Federica Mogherini, 
The article of the Treaty does not require any formal decision or council conclusions 
to be taken. So, we need no further formality to move on. And let me also clarify, this 
does not imply EU CSDP mission or operation. This calls for aid and assistance 
bilaterally and the European Union can facilitate this and coordinate this, whenever 
and however it is useful and necessary.2 
Last, but not least, Art. 42.7 provides a basis for stronger and faster military action against 
Daesh sites outside EU territory, while at the same time leaving open the possibility to invoke 
the other clauses in future, for example to take longer-term measures against Daesh – for which 
the Solidarity Clause and the access to a broader set of EU instruments and financing might 
be more effective.  
EU mutual assistance in practice 
Since this is the first time the clause has been activated, we have no practical experience with 
how developments will actually unfold on the ground. Nevertheless, one can envisage EU 
member states’ aid and assistance to France developing as follows.  
                                                     
1 For a more detailed legal analysis, see C. Hillion and S. Blockmans, “EU self-defence: Tous pour un et 
un pour tous?”, CEPS Commentary, 20 November 2015. 
2 Remarques introductives de la Haute Représentante et Vice-Présidente Federica Mogherini lors de la 
conférence de presse avec Jean Yves Le Drian, Ministre de la Défense Français, 17 novembre 2015 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151117_01_fr.htm).  
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Process. France and member states are to agree on a bilateral basis on the specific support 
required, with the High Representative in a coordinating role to ensure effectiveness in the 
common response.  
Focus and scale of the contributions. According to French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, 
member states are expected to provide capacities in support of French interventions in Syria 
and Iraq, as well as to contribute towards interventions (ongoing or future) in other 
operational theatres, including North Africa, the Sahel and Central African Republic. This 
broad characterisation of the tasks provides a wide margin in which each member state’s 
contribution can be negotiated and agreed upon based on its particular defence and foreign 
policies and the assets available. One might naturally ask what chain of command and 
accountability framework will be established, and to what extent will such arrangements be 
sustainable in the long run.  
Europe’s fight against terror: Implications and significance  
With the activation of the mutual assistance clause, the fight against Daesh has been 
significantly Europeanised beyond the justice and home affairs domain, to include security. 
Such a dynamic, however, follows an intergovernmental logic of consultations. Europe finds 
itself in a gray area between an ‘EU war on terror’ and a ‘French-led coalition of the willing’. 
Art. 42.7 gives sufficient flexibility and discretion to member states to decide their own level 
of contribution and political engagement under French political and operational command, 
but the EU has chosen to unequivocally stand up in response to the horrific attacks in Paris on 
November 13th. And the fact the some of the terrorists in Paris originated from and have 
subsequently returned to their home in Brussels underlines the European character of the 
threat posed by Daesh and the need to muster a European response. Spain, the UK and other 
member states have similarly suffered deadly attacks by Islamists, which should predispose 
all these countries to look favourably on Hollande's initiative. 
What now? European security is entering unchartered territory of a large-scale conflict. While 
the implementation, outcome and implications are undetermined, three recommendations can 
be offered to avoid uncoordinated or piecemeal responses that may result in a prolonged 
campaign with and eventually strengthen Daesh:  
1. Don’t go national, be united. Mutual assistance is a declaration of principle, but action and 
deliverables must now follow. This will be the trickiest part, as states will have divergent 
views over how to conduct military operations, the means to be deployed and the 
potential risks for the civilian population. The EU should therefore remain united, and 
this can be achieved by gradually moving from providing short-term, flexible, 
intergovernmental military assistance to France (the practical interpretation of Art. 42.7), 
to a longer-term strategic vision entailing the use of broader security and conflict 
management instruments, more in tune with Article 222 TFEU. Appropriate funding 
mechanisms should be adopted to foster cooperation in critical sectors, beginning with 
intelligence sharing, leading to a fully-fledged EU intelligence agency and better 
coordination of intelligence operations. Mutatis mutandis, a permanent and more 
structured framework for defence cooperation (a European Defence Union) could help 
achieve this purpose.3  
2. Use soft and hard power. Military force may weaken Daesh, but comprehensive efforts will 
also be needed to tackle the root causes of terrorism, which air strikes cannot fix. Root 
causes should be tackled outside the EU borders, by fully implementing comprehensive 
                                                     
3 S. Blockmans and G. Faleg, More Union in European Defence, Report of the CEPS Task Force on European 
Security and Defence, Chaired by Javier Solana, CEPS, Brussels, March 2015. 
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conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction policies in fragile countries in the 
Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, linking security to development, 
economic growth and good governance; as well as inside the EU member states, by 
creating conditions for peaceful and inclusive communities, preventing the formation of 
banlieues and urban enclaves. Both state fragility and social exclusion of immigrants are 
perfect breeding grounds for terrorism.  
These principles should also be reflected in the EU’s approach to migration. While 
strengthening controls at the EU’s external borders can be a reasonable measure to 
prevent the inflow of terrorists, calling Schengen into question or the massive rejection 
of immigrants would compromise those values the EU is fighting for. 
3. Engage partners. This is also a global crisis, for which a smarter use of the EU’s 
multilateral strategy is needed. An agenda based on comprehensiveness in crisis 
response requires a rethinking of current methodologies of engagement, a better division 
of labour with other international organisations and a political consensus with regional 
and global powers. New partnerships should be forged on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account local conditions and needs in operational theatres, along the lines of the La 
Valletta Summit – but with more substantial financial and political pledges. Closer 
monitoring of conditions in fragile countries and timely intervention are necessary to 
implement effective prevention and reconstruction policies. Similarly, the engagement 
of the United States, Russia and other players, especially from the region around Syria 
and Iraq (such as Turkey and the Gulf states), will be important in defining a 
comprehensive strategy for the EU and in reaching political deals (as in the case of Syria), 
and rebuilding peaceful communities in territories currently occupied by Daesh.  
